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The 2021 Peak: A Case Study in Speculative Excess
The peak of the 2020 to 2021 speculative cycle will be studied in future editions of Kindleberger the way the South Sea Bubble and the dot-com peak are studied in current ones: as a unusually well-documented case of euphoria, where the evidence of excess is preserved in SPAC prospectuses, venture term sheets, crypto white papers, and the social media commentary of the participants in real time. What made 2021 unusual, even by the standards of speculative manias, was the simul

MG
Mar 63 min read
Kindleberger's Anatomy of a Bubble: A Field Guide for the Present Moment
Charles Kindleberger's Manias, Panics, and Crashes, first published in 1978 and updated through five editions, is the most useful book ever written about financial bubbles — not because it provides a predictive model but because it provides a diagnostic one. Kindleberger, drawing on Minsky's theoretical framework and his own deep knowledge of financial history, described the anatomy of a speculative mania with enough precision that subsequent bubbles can be mapped onto his sc

MG
Mar 63 min read
Minsky Was Right: The Financial Instability Hypothesis and Why Stability Is Destabilizing
Hyman Minsky spent most of his career at Washington University in St. Louis largely ignored by mainstream economics, which had concluded — with the confidence that precedes most large intellectual mistakes — that financial markets were self-stabilizing and that the business cycle had been tamed. Minsky argued the opposite: that financial stability is itself destabilizing, that the longer a period of economic calm persists the more fragile the financial system becomes, and tha

MG
Mar 63 min read
Zombie Companies and the Cost of Free Capital: What Schumpeter Would Have Said
Joseph Schumpeter's concept of creative destruction rests on a mechanism that is easy to describe and politically difficult to allow: the elimination of unproductive capital. In Schumpeter's model, recessions perform a necessary function — they clear the economic landscape of firms and capital structures that are no longer viable, freeing resources for more productive deployment. The recession is the forest fire that makes new growth possible. The ZIRP era was, among other th

MG
Mar 63 min read
The Venture Capital Bubble Was a Monetary Phenomenon: A Post-Mortem
The venture capital boom of 2020 and 2021 was not primarily a technology phenomenon. It was a monetary phenomenon that expressed itself through technology. The distinction matters because the lessons drawn from the subsequent correction are different depending on which explanation you accept. The technology-as-cause narrative goes like this: extraordinary technological progress — cloud computing, AI, remote work infrastructure — created genuine business opportunities of unpre

MG
Mar 63 min read
The Decade of Free Money: What ZIRP Actually Did to Capital Allocation
Between 2008 and 2022, with one brief interruption between 2015 and 2019, the Federal Reserve maintained interest rates at or near zero. The European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan went further — negative nominal rates, a policy innovation so radical that its architects treated it as temporary and its critics treated it as dangerous. What followed was the longest period of artificially suppressed borrowing costs in the history of modern central banking, and its effects on

MG
Mar 63 min read


Keynes in the Boardroom: Uncertainty, Animal Spirits, and Why Investor Sentiment Is Not Irrational
John Maynard Keynes is most famous for his macroeconomic work — the General Theory, the case for countercyclical fiscal policy, the architecture of Bretton Woods. Less discussed but equally relevant to anyone navigating capital markets is Keynes the investor and Keynes the theorist of uncertainty — a Keynes who understood, from direct experience managing the King's College Cambridge endowment and losing much of his personal fortune in the 1929 crash before rebuilding it, that

MG
Mar 53 min read


How to Prepare for a Series A: The 12-Month Checklist
Most founders think about Series A preparation the wrong way. They treat it as a materials problem — get the deck right, clean up the model, practice the pitch. Those things matter. But the actual work that separates fundable companies from ones that get passed on happens 9 to 12 months before you ever sit across from an investor. Here is what that work looks like, month by month. 12 Months Out: Get your financial house in order If you don't have clean, accurate monthly finan

MG
Mar 24 min read


Eight Billion
The world population has just reached an estimated eight billion people. The relationship between economic growth and population growth is a

MG
Nov 16, 20221 min read


SaaS Thoughts (October)
aaas layoffs, demand, b2b, venture-backed, venture capital, competition, Michael porter, profit, federal reserve, saas, salesforce

MG
Oct 31, 20221 min read
The 2021 Peak: A Case Study in Speculative Excess
The peak of the 2020 to 2021 speculative cycle will be studied in future editions of Kindleberger the way the South Sea Bubble and the dot-com peak are studied in current ones: as a unusually well-documented case of euphoria, where the evidence of excess is preserved in SPAC prospectuses, venture term sheets, crypto white papers, and the social media commentary of the participants in real time. What made 2021 unusual, even by the standards of speculative manias, was the simul
Mar 63 min read
Kindleberger's Anatomy of a Bubble: A Field Guide for the Present Moment
Charles Kindleberger's Manias, Panics, and Crashes, first published in 1978 and updated through five editions, is the most useful book ever written about financial bubbles — not because it provides a predictive model but because it provides a diagnostic one. Kindleberger, drawing on Minsky's theoretical framework and his own deep knowledge of financial history, described the anatomy of a speculative mania with enough precision that subsequent bubbles can be mapped onto his sc
Mar 63 min read
Minsky Was Right: The Financial Instability Hypothesis and Why Stability Is Destabilizing
Hyman Minsky spent most of his career at Washington University in St. Louis largely ignored by mainstream economics, which had concluded — with the confidence that precedes most large intellectual mistakes — that financial markets were self-stabilizing and that the business cycle had been tamed. Minsky argued the opposite: that financial stability is itself destabilizing, that the longer a period of economic calm persists the more fragile the financial system becomes, and tha
Mar 63 min read
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